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Abstract—Understanding and analyzing cascading failures in
power grids have been the focus of many researchers for years.
However, the complex interactions among the large number
of components in these systems and their contributions to
cascading failures are not yet completely understood. Therefore,
various techniques have been developed and used to model and
analyze the underlying interactions among the components of
the power grid with respect to cascading failures. Such methods
are important to reveal the essential information that may not
be readily available from power system physical models and
topologies. In general, the influences and interactions among
the components of the system may occur both locally and at
distance due to the physics of electricity governing the power
flow dynamics as well as other functional and cyber dependencies
among the components of the system. To infer and capture such
interactions, data-driven approaches or techniques based on the
physics of electricity have been used to develop graph-based
models of interactions among the components of the power grid.
In this survey, various methods of developing interaction graphs
as well as studies on the reliability and cascading failure analysis
of power grids using these graphs have been reviewed.
Index Terms—interaction graphs; cascading failures; data-
driven; electrical distance; power grids; system modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
A. An Overview of the Review and Overall Significance
Cascading failures in power grids are successive interde-
pendent failures of components in the system, which are
usually initiated by few outages due to internal or exogenous
disturbances and are propagated in a relatively short period of
time leading to large blackouts [1], [2]. Examples of blackouts
that resulted from cascading failures are the case of US
Northeast blackout in 2003 [3], Italian blackout in 2003 [4],
Brazilian blackout in 2009 [5], and Indian blackout in 2012
[6]. While large blackouts are infrequent, their occurrence still
has substantial risks associated with the significant economic
losses and social impacts that they cause. Understanding
and mitigating cascading failures in power systems remain
a challenge due to the large size of these systems as well
as complex and sometimes hidden interactions among the
components. Various studies and models have been developed
to understand and control these complex phenomena including
methods based on power system simulation [7], [8], deter-
ministic analytical models [9], probabilistic models [10]–[12],
and graph-based models [13]–[63]. For a survey of various
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methods for studying cascading failures, see [64]–[69]. Each
of these approaches shed light on different aspects of these
phenomena.
Among these categories of approaches, graph-based meth-
ods have attracted a lot of attention due to the simplicity
of the models and their ability to describe the propagation
behavior of the failures on the graph of the system [70],
[71]. Many initial graph-based models were developed based
on the physical topology of the power system, where the
connections among the nodes represent the actual physical
connections among the components of the system [72], [73].
However, the studies in [62], [74] showed the lack of strong
connection between the physical topology of the system and
failure propagation in cascading failures in power grids. In
general, influences and interactions among the components of
the system during cascade process may occur both locally
and at distance due to the physics of electricity governing
the power flow dynamics as well as other functional and
cyber dependencies among the components of the system.
For instance, historical as well as simulation data verify that
failure of a critical transmission line in the power grid may
cause overload/failure of another transmission line that may
or may not be topologically close. Therefore, graph models
based on the physical topology of the system are not adequate
in describing the propagation behavior of failures in power
grids. Hence, new methods are emerging to reveal the complex
and hidden interactions that may not be readily available from
physical topology of the power system. These new approaches
are focused on extracting and modeling the underlying graph
of interactions among the components of the system. While
the focus of this survey is on graph-based methods, other
modeling approaches such as probabilistic, risk analysis-based,
and agent-based approaches [75] can also be used for modeling
interactions among the components of the system.
B. Review Methodology
In this survey, various techniques for building the inter-
action graphs are reviewed. While the main focus of this
survey is on the methods for constructing interaction graphs,
reliability studies, and analyses performed using such graphs
are also briefly discussed.The benefit of interaction graphs is
that the interactions among the components are topologically
local, which simplifies the study and analysis of propagation
behavior of failures and properties/roles of various compo-
nents in the system during the cascade process. Note that as
cascading failures are attributed to the transmission network
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2of power grids, the focus of these studies are mainly on the
transmission network. Moreover, the majority of studies based
on the interaction graphs are focused on cascading failure
analyses in power grids; however, interaction graphs can be
used for other applications in power grids (e.g., analyzing
reliability to targeted attacks) or even other networked systems
such as transportation networks [76], [77].
The earliest research study in finding interactions between
components can be traced back to the 1989 study in [78], in
which interactions between the buses in the system represented
a measure of electrical distance between components based
on changes in voltage magnitude sensitivities. While the
power grid analyzed in this study was not modeled as a
graph, the concept in this study has been widely adapted
by numerous graph-based models to represent interactions
between components. In this survey, methods for constructing
interaction graphs are broadly categorized into two main
classes: data-driven approaches and electric distance-based
approaches. As the name implies, the data-driven approaches
for building interaction graphs rely on data collected from
the system (historical and real data or simulation data) for
inferring and characterizing interactions among the compo-
nents of the system. Further, three categories are defined for
data-driven interaction graphs based on the method used for
analyzing the data.These include: (1) methods based on outage
sequence analysis [13]–[37], (2) risk-graph methods [38]–
[41], and (3) correlation-based methods [29], [30], [42], [79].
The category of outage sequence analysis is further divided
into four sub-categories including (i) consecutive failure-based
methods [13]–[20], (ii) generation-based methods [21]–[26],
(iii) influence-based methods [27]–[30], and (iv) multiple
and simultaneous failure-based methods [31]–[37]. This novel
taxonomy is used to classify thirty detailed research studies,
including conference and journal publications, in the data-
driven category into various subcategories.
On the other hand, electric distance-based approaches ex-
ploit properties based on the physics of power and electricity
governed by Kirchoff’s laws to define interactions among the
components. Thus, the interactions are represented by electri-
cal distances, which illustrates the properties of the electrical
interactions based on power flows among the components.
Two sub-categories are defined for electric distance-based
interaction graphs based on the power grid conditions that are
considered for creating the graphs. These include: (1) methods
that define the interactions based on changes in the power flow
due to changes in physical attributes of components caused
by outage conditions [43]–[47] and (2) methods that define
the interactions among components during normal or non-
outage operating conditions [48]–[63], [78]. The category of
defining interactions during non-outage operating conditions
is classified into two sub-categories: (i) impedance-based
methods, which define interactions by considering a single
impedance measure among the components connected over
multiple paths [48]–[59] and (ii) sensitivities in components’
states due to changes in voltage magnitudes and voltage phase
angles [60]–[63], [78]. This novel taxonomy is used to classify
twenty-one detailed research studies, including conference and
journal publications, in the electric distance-based category
into various subcategories. Figure 1 shows the taxonomy of the
reviewed methods for constructing various types of interaction
graphs. The figure also specifies section numbers for the
categories and subcategories, in which the methods have been
discussed. Research studies included in this review have been
found using databases such as IEEE Explore, Elsevier, AIP
(American Institute of Physics) Publishing, Springer, APS
(American Physical Society) Physics, and MDPI. Most studies
in this review are fairly recent and have been published in the
past decade.
In addition to the review of various methods for constructing
interaction graphs, various reliability analysis and studies
performed using these graphs are also briefly reviewed. Some
studies of interaction graphs are focused on identifying critical
components in the cascade process of power grids [14]–[24],
[27]–[31], [38]–[40], [48], [56]–[59]. These studies can have
different purposes such as (1) identifying the vulnerable or
most influential components of the system in the cascade
process by utilizing standard centrality metrics [14]–[20], [50],
[54] or defining new centrality metrics [21]–[24] and (2)
identifying the set of components whose upgrade (for instance,
by increasing the power flow capacity of transmission lines) or
protection can help in mitigating the risk of cascading failures
and large blackouts [27], [28], [31], [58] or quantifying the
performance of the grids after addition of new transmission
lines [58], [59]. To characterize the latter, some works [16],
[38]–[40], [59] focus on the response of power grids to attacks
and failure scenarios using metrics that quantify the efficiency
of the grid before and after the attacks. Furthermore, to
characterize the role of components in the cascade process,
some efforts are focused on characterizing the patterns and
structures in interaction graphs using community detection ap-
proaches [29], [30] or tree structures [43], [44]. Moreover, the
work in [44] uses interaction graphs to identify transmission
lines that when switched off create partitions that limit the
propagation of failures in the power grid. Some studies [31],
[42] also use the structures and patterns in interaction graphs
to characterize and predict the distribution of cascade sizes.
Similarly, structures in interaction graphs have been used for
reliability analysis of zonal patterns [51] and partitioning into
voltage control regions [78].
C. Key Contributions and Review Structure
The key contributions of this review work are as follows:
1) A novel classification of methods for constructing in-
teraction graphs into two categories: data-driven and
electric distance-based approaches as well as multiple
sub-categories as shown in Figure 1.
2) A comprehensive study and detailed discussion on the
techniques used in the construction of interaction graphs.
Moreover, key properties and limitations of each type of
interaction graph is discussed. Suggestions on addressing
the limitations and possible future directions are pre-
sented.
3) A brief overview of cascading failure analysis in power
grids using the constructed interaction graphs are pre-
sented.
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FIG. 1: Taxonomy of methods for constructing interaction graphs with section numbers shown for the categories and sub-
categories.
The organization of the rest of the review is as follows. In
Section II, a brief discussion on the preliminary terms pertinent
to this review is presented including: (1) definition and causes
of cascading failures, (2) well established cascading failure
models in literature, and (3) physical topology-based graphs
of power grids. In Section III, a comprehensive discussion
on the various methods for constructing interaction graphs is
provided, and in Section IV, a brief discussion is presented on
the reliability analysis and cascading failure studies performed
using the interaction graphs constructed in Section III. Finally,
in Section V, the review is summarized and concluded.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Cascading Failures
Cascading failures are the leading cause of wide area
blackouts [3]. While large blackouts are infrequent, the power
law behavior exhibited by the blackout size distribution (e.g.,
measured in terms of unserved energy, numbers of customers
with no service, number of transmission lines tripped) warrants
the need to study such events [7]. A cascading failure can be
defined as a sequence of interdependent outage events, initi-
ated by few outages or disturbances [1], [64]. The initiating
events can be attributed to various factors such as natural
disasters, vegetation disturbances (e.g., tree contact), human
errors, software/hardware errors, and so on. In recent years,
cyber/physical attacks on power grids, such as the case of
the Ukrainian cyber attack of 2015 [80], are also precursors
to cascading failures. After the occurrence of the initiating
events, the dependent sequence of outages results from various
internal events such as voltage and angular instabilities, line
overloads, hidden failures caused due to the misbehavior of
protection devices as well as errors related to maintenance,
operation, and human factors [64]. Further, various operating
conditions of the power grid, such as the initial loading
conditions of the components, also affect the behavior of the
overall power grid during cascade processes.
B. Models of Cascading Failures
Modeling and studying cascading failures include a diverse
field of techniques and approaches. They include topological
models, high level statistical models, deterministic and prob-
abilistic models, simulation-based models for analyzing quasi
steady and dynamic behavior of the system, or hybrid models,
interdependent models with other systems (e.g., communica-
tion systems), and so on (see [66]). Many of these meth-
ods have been bench-marked and validated as well as cross
validated [81], [82]. Since this review is focused on graph-
based methods, the upcoming sections begin by discussing
the physical topology-based graphs of power grids and their
limitations in representing interactions among components
during cascading failures, which motivates the subsequent
discussion of interaction graphs for power grids.
C. Physical Topology-Based Graphs of Power Grids
As mentioned in Section I, initial graph-based studies of
power grids, such as [70]–[73], were based on the physical
topology of the power grid. In general, a power grid can
simply be represented by a graph, G = (V,E), where V
represents the set of generator, transmission, substation, or
load buses, and E represents the set of power lines [83]. Such a
graph shows the physical connectivity among the components
of the system. Various studies have been performed on the
physical topology of the power grids by analyzing their global
structural properties [72], [73], such as average path length,
clustering coefficient, and degree distribution, for analyzing
power grids with respect to standard complex networks such as
small world, random, and scale-free graphs. Particularly, in the
study in [73], the average path length and clustering coefficient
of real-world power grids were compared to their equivalent
random and scale-free network models. However, the study
concluded that real-world power grids differed significantly
from standard network models as the clustering coefficient and
the average path length of real-world grids were significantly
greater than that of their complex network model counterparts.
Some studies performed on the physical topology also focused
4on properties of the electrical connections [84] identified using
centrality measures such as degree, eigenvector, closeness,
and betweenness (for a review and definition of centrality
measures refer to [85]). However, it has also been discussed
that physical graphs may be inadequate in representing and
capturing the interactions among the components of the power
grid [62], [74], specifically for analyzing cascading failures.
This limitation is due to the inability of the physical graphs to
capture the dynamics of interactions at-distance in cascading
failures, for instance, due to Kirchoff’s and Ohm’s laws. In
recent literature, some studies consider the physical as well as
electrical properties of power grids. The focus of such studies
is on the generation of synthetic power grid networks that
consider the heterogeneity of the components in terms of their
operating voltages [83], [86]. In such types of graphs, each
vertex is associated with a voltage rating such that transmission
lines are represented as edges between vertices of the same
voltage level and voltage transformers are represented as edges
between vertices with different voltage levels. However, exten-
sive analysis of such graphs for cascading failure scenarios is
still an open research problem.
III. GRAPH OF INTERACTIONS
In this section, the methods of modeling power systems by
graphs of interactions are reviewed in two distinct categories:
data-driven methods and electric distance-based methods.
These methods build a graph of interactions for the system,
denoted by Gi = (Vi, Ei) in which the set of vertices Vi
are the components of the system whose interactions are of
interest, such as the set of buses or transmission lines. Further,
the set Ei represents the set of interactions/influences among
the components, which may be directed, undirected, weighted
(representing the strength of interactions or influences), or
unweighted depending on the analysis of interest.
A. Data-Driven Methods for Interaction Graphs
Various data-driven approaches have been proposed for
inferring and modeling interactions among the components of
the power grid. These approaches rely on data from simulation
or historical outage datasets. As the historical datasets are
limited, the majority of studies use simulation data. However,
the focus of this review is not on reviewing the mechanism
for generating cascade data; for example, from power system
simulations. Rather, the focus is on modeling the cascade data
into interaction graphs and the subsequent reliability analysis
performed on such interaction graphs. The cascade datasets
used in the various methods will be mentioned as necessary
when discussing the methods. In this paper, five classes of
data-driven methods have been identified and reviewed for
modeling interaction graphs for studying cascading failures in
power grids as shown in Table I. Next, each class of method
is discussed in detail.
1) Interaction Graphs Based on Outage Sequences in Cas-
cading Failures: This class of methods rely on cascading
failure data in the form of a sequence of failures in each
cascade. For instance, the sequence l5 → l7 → l3 → l6
represents an example of sequence of transmission line failures
in a cascade scenario, where li represents outaged transmission
lines and the arrow represents the order in which the lines
failed during cascades. These methods are based on analysis
of sequence of failures for extracting interactions and focus on
the cause and effect interactions among failure of components.
Methods in this category use various techniques and statistics
to analyze such data as discussed next.
a) Interaction Graph Based on Consecutive Failures:
In this category of outage sequence analysis, only direct
consecutive failures in a sequence are used for deriving the
interaction links among the components of the system. In
other words, two components in the system have an inter-
action link, ei,j ∈ Ei, only if they appear as successive
outages in the order li → lj in a cascade scenario in the
dataset. The order of the outages represents the direction
of the links in the interaction graph, e.g., outage sequence
l5 → l7 suggests an outgoing link from node l5 to node
l7. Further, if the example sequence l5 → l7 → l3 → l6
represents a longer sequence of transmission line failures in
a cascade scenario, the following directed interaction edges
will belong to graph Gi, i.e., {e5,7, e7,3, and e3,6} ∈ Ei.
The strength of interactions among the components in this
case can be characterized using the statistics of occurrences
of pairs of successive outages in cascade scenarios in the
dataset. For instance, the work in [13] assigns weights to
the interaction edges by statistical analysis of the number
of times that a pair of successive line outages occurs in the
cascade dataset. For instance, the weight of the interaction
link from node la to node lb can be characterized as |la →
lb|/(total number of successive pairs in the overall cascade
dataset), where |la → lb| is the number of times failures la and
lb occurred successively in the cascade dataset. These weights
can be interpreted as the probability of occurrence of each
pair of successive line outages. Examples of studies using
this method to develop the power grid’s graph of interactions
include [13]–[20], where transmission lines in the system are
the vertices Vi of the interaction graph Gi.
In the study presented in [87], the sequences of consecutive
failures are called fault chains. For creating the dataset of
fault chains, in the first step, a single transmission line is
tripped as the initiator of cascading failure in the simulation,
and in the subsequent steps, the most overloaded component
due to power flow re-distributions is considered as the next
failure in the overall sequence of consecutive failures. In
the studies in [14]–[16], [18]–[20], for a power grid with n
transmission lines, n fault chains are created, and the edges
among consecutive failures in each chain are weighted based
on power flow changes in a line after the failure. In the work
in [17], fault chains are created by considering multiple initial
failures such that a system with n transmission lines may
have more than n fault chains. In addition to power flow re-
distributions, the work in [19] also considers the temperature
evolution process of transmission lines during cascades while
constructing fault chains. Thus, the fault chains are capable
of reflecting thermo-physical effects of transmission lines
during cascades. Finally, a fault chain graph is developed by
combining all fault chains together into a single graph where
the vertices are all the components that have failed in the
5TABLE I: Classification of existing studies using the data-driven taxonomy.
Category Subcategory Further Subcategory Works
Data-driven
Interaction Graphs
Outage Sequence
Consecutive Failures [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]
Generation-based Failures [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26]
Influence-based [27], [28], [29], [30]
Multiple and Simultaneous Failures [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37]
Risk-graph [38], [39], [40], [41]
Correlation-based [29], [30], [42]
fault chains, and the edges between the vertices exist if the
outages have successively occurred in the fault chains. For
pairs of outages (li → lj) that have reoccurred in multiple
fault chains, their combined edge weight in the fault chain
graph is averaged.
b) Interaction Graph Using Generation-based Analysis
of Failures: The method based on the consecutive failures
discussed in Section III-A1a focuses on one to one impact that
the outage of a line has on the outage of another line. However,
in cascading failures, instead of pair-wise interactions among
successive failures, a group of failures may contribute to
failures of other components. Therefore, it is important to
consider the effects of groups of failures and characterize
interactions among the components based on the effects among
groups of components. The works presented in [21]–[25]
define such groups as generation of failures within a cascade
process, which are failures that occur within short temporal
distance of each other.In these works, the sequence of failures
in the cascade are divided into sequence of generations, and the
failure induced cause and effect relationships are considered
between consecutive generations. Specifically, outages occur-
ring in generation m+1 are assumed to be caused by outages
in generation m.
The interactions based on successive generations are defined
in different ways in the literature. For instance, the authors
in [27] assume that all components in generation m have
interactions with all components in generation m + 1, i.e.,
if generation m has n1 number of components and generation
m + 1 has n2 number of components, then the number of
interactions between generation m and m+1 will be n1×n2.
However, some studies argue that considering all possible
pairs of interactions among components of two consecutive
generations overestimates the interactions among components
[21]–[26]. Specifically, all line outages in one generation may
not be the cause of a line outage in the next generation.
Therefore, in the works presented in [21], [23], the cause
of failure of a line k in generation m + 1 is considered to
be due to the failure of a line in generation m with the
maximum influence value on the line k. The influence value
for component j in generation m is defined as the number of
times that the component j has failed in generation m before
the failure of line k in the successive generation m + 1 in
the cascade dataset. For cases where two or more lines in
generation m have the same maximum influence values on
line k in generation m+ 1, all such components are assumed
to interact with line k. In the works discussed so far in this
section, the interaction among component j in generation m
and component k in generation m+ 1 will be represented by
a directed link ej,k.
While the works in [21], [23] limit the interactions by
only considering the maximum influence values in current
generation as the probable cause of component failures in
the next generation, the work in [22] gives an estimate of
the interactions between successive generations using the
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm. Initially, all failed
components in generation m are assumed to be the causes
of failure of all components in generation m + 1. However,
the actual components in generation m (hidden variables) that
cause failure of components in generation m + 1 are found
using the iterative process of updating the probabilities of
failures. Thus, after the iterative update process is completed,
some probabilities of failures between components may be
zero, which removes the overestimated interactions of the
initial assumption.
The weight of the interaction links can also be defined
in various ways. For instance, the weight of the link can
be defined as the ratio of number of times that the pair
of components appeared in two successive generations over
the total number of times that component k has appeared in
the dataset. This weight can be interpreted as the likelihood
of failure of component k in the next generation given the
failure of component j in the current generation. The work
in [24] also generates the graph of interactions based on the
maximum influences among generations in cascades, similar
to the method used in [21], [23]. However, the graph of
interactions has two additional layers: one layer to capture
the weight of interactions based on the amount of load
shed that has occurred after the failures in generation m
(therefore, the dataset requires additional information about
the amount of load shed during the cascade process) and the
other layer to capture the weights of interactions based on the
electric distance between transmission lines during the cascade
process. We will present the detailed discussion of the electric
distance-based interactions in Section III-B2. The study in [26]
considers both statistical properties as well as the amount of
load shed that has occurred between successive generations
to assign interaction link weights. However, the study in [26]
identified islands formed in the power grids during outages
and then selectively assigned links between components of
successive generations only if the generations were located in
6islands that were direct consequences of one another.
c) Influence-Based Interaction Graph: In this method,
the interactions among the components are derived based on
successive generations in cascades; however, the weights of the
interactions are characterized based on the influence model and
the branching process probabilistic framework. The influence
model is a networked Markov chain framework, originally
introduced in [88] and was first applied to cascade dataset
in the work presented in [89]. This survey reviews the studies
that use the influence model in the context of power grids
to develop the graph of interactions. In these studies, the
transmission lines in the system are considered as the vertices
Vi of the interaction graph Gi and the influences/interactions
between the lines as the edges Ei.
In [27], authors consider interaction links among all pairs
of lines in two successive generations in a cascade using
the influence model. The weights of the directed links are
derived in two steps. In the first step, a branching process
approach is used in which each component can produce a
random number of outages in the next generation. The number
of induced outages by each component is assumed to have a
Poisson distribution based on the branching process model.
Parameter λi specifies the propagation rate (mean number of
outages) in generation m+1 for the outage of component i in
generation m. In other words, this step defines the impact of
components on the process of cascade by describing how many
failures their failure can generate [12]. In the second step,
it is assumed that given that component i causes k outages
in the next generation, some components are more likely to
outage than others. Therefore, they calculate the conditional
probability g(j|i), which is the probability of component j
failing in generation m+ 1, given the failure of component i
in generation m. If only g(j|i) values based on the statistical
analysis of data are considered, then the probability of failure
of component j given component i failure will be known;
however, the expected number of failures from failure of
component i is not known. Hence, both steps are important
in characterizing the influences among components.
The final step consists of combining the information from
the first and second steps into a single influence matrix H
(representing the links of graph of interactions and their
weights). The elements of the matrix are defined based on
the conditional probability that a particular component j fails
in the next generation m+1, given that component i has failed
in generation m and that generation m + 1 includes exactly
k failures. This probability can be defined as P (j|i, k) =
1− (1− g[j|i])k. Then, the conditional probability hi,j,m that
component j fails in generation m+1, given that component i
failed in generation m, over all possible values of k represents
the actual elements of H and is found by multiplying P (j|i, k)
with the probability of k failures occurring as follows:
hi,j,m =
∞∑
k=0
(1− (1− g[j|i]k))λ
k
i,m
k!
e−λi,m . (1)
Based on the influence graph, cascading failures can start
with a line outage at a node of the graph and propagate prob-
abilistically along the directed links in the graph. Examples of
other works, that have used the influence-based approach to
derive the graph of interactions for power grids include [28]–
[30].
d) Interaction Graph of Multiple and Simultaneous Fail-
ures: This class of methods also use the sequence of failures to
model interactions among components of the system; however,
they consider the interactions among multiple simultaneous
failures.
Specifically, in the study presented in [31], a Markovian
graph was developed with the goal of addressing the problem
of capturing the effect of multiple simultaneous outages within
generations on the characterization of the interactions among
the components of the successive generations in a cascade.
In this case, the nodes of the graph represent the states of the
Markov chain defined as the set of line outages in a generation
of the cascade, and the links represent the transition among
the states (i.e., interactions between successive generations of
outages). Hence, each node in the graph may represent the
outage of a single line or multiple lines. Markovian interaction
graphs differ from generation-based and influence-based inter-
action graphs as edges are the interactions between successive
generations of sets of line outages instead of the individual
interactions between line outages in successive generations.
Markovian interaction graphs also consider a node with a null
state, which represents the state where the cascade stops. This
state occurs at the end of all cascade scenarios. The transition
probabilities among the states (i.e., the weight of the links)
from state i to state j can be estimated by counting the number
of consecutive states in which state i and state j occur in all
the cascades and dividing by the number of occurrences of
state i.
Other studies that consider the interaction among multi-
ple failures at the same time are presented in [32], [33].
In these works, the state of each component in the power
grid, including buses and transmission lines/transformers, is
represented by 0 for a failed condition and 1 for a working
condition. Then, states of all components in the power grid
are aggregated and represented by a vector with size n + l,
where n is the number of buses and l is the number of
transmission lines/transformers. A single state vector can be
regarded as a node in the interaction graph, and there are
exactly 2n+l number of nodes in the graph, representing all
possible states. Initially, all components in the power grid are
in working condition such that the initial state consists of
a state vector i represented by all ones. After a component
failure occurs, the state of the component changes to 0, and
the corresponding entry of the component in the initial state
vector i is also updated, and thus, a new state vector j is
formed. This transition is represented in the interaction graph
by a directed link from the initial state vector i to the updated
state vector j. This process is continued for all sequences of
failures in the cascade dataset. Finally, some nodes in the state
transition graph may be highly connected whereas some nodes
may be isolated. Note the obtained interaction graph is directed
but unweighted.
Other examples of methods that consider interactions of
multiple failures at the same time include [34]–[37]. In these
works, fault chains are used to construct a state failure
7network. Each fault chain is also associated with its final load
loss value. Note that the definition of a fault chain has already
been discussed in Section III-A1a. Similar to the studies in
[32], [33], each component is represented by binary values
0 or 1 for working and failed conditions, respectively. The
working/failed conditions for all components in the system are
aggregated to form a state. Each state is an n-dimension vector,
where n is the number of transmission lines in the power grid.
However, in contrast to the studies in [32], [33], where all pos-
sible states, i.e., 2n, are considered as nodes in the interaction
graph, states are enumerated from the fault chain data. For
example, for a fault chain {l5 → l7 → l3 → l6} → loadloss,
four states are used for representing the four line faults in the
chain, and a single state is used to represent the total load
loss associated with the fault chain. All such fault chains in
the cascade dataset are combined together into the state failure
network. Nodes in the network represent the states enumerated
from the complete dataset, and links in the network represent
the failed component occurring immediately after a particular
state. Thus, the links can be regarded as records of component
failures that occur after a state. Next, nodes and links in the
network are assigned weights by back-propagation of the final
load losses based on the probability of occurrence of the links.
Thus, each node (state) and each link (failed component) is
associated with an expected load loss after their occurrence.
2) Risk Graphs for Interaction Graph: The work presented
in [38] introduces the risk-based interaction graphs, which
describe the interactions or relationships among the nodes (i.e.,
buses/substations) of the power grid based on the effects of
their simultaneous failures in causing damage in the system.
This graph is not solely focused on analysis of interactions
among components during cascading failures. Instead, it is
focused on the vulnerability analysis of the power grid, and the
effect of failures is assessed using metrics such as net-ability,
which measures the effectiveness of a power grid subjected
to failures, based on power system attributes including power
injection limitation and impedance among the components.
Construction of risk graphs is done in two steps. The first
step includes generating and tracking the sets of strongest node
combinations whose simultaneous failures have significant
effects on the power grid. Identification of such sets of strong
node combinations can be done by reducing the search space
or exhaustive search methods [38], [39]. Reduced search space
strategy is the preferred method for computational purposes.
For instance, in [39], the search works as follows: given m-
node combination of components, which causes damage in
the network, m + k-node combination (where k represents
additional components) should cause an even greater damage.
In the second step, these sets of strong node combinations
are used to form the risk graphs. If a node appears at least
once in the sets of strong node combinations, then the node
becomes a vertex of the risk graph. Links among nodes in
the risk graph exist if they appear in the same set of strong
node combinations. Both nodes and links in the risk graph
are weighted based on the frequency of their appearance in
the sets of strong node combinations. This approach results
in a weighted but undirected node risk graph, where higher
weight values on the links suggest stronger node combinations.
Node risk graphs are dependent on the system parameters
such as ratio of capacity to the initial load of the nodes in
the system. To remove dependencies on system parameters,
node risk graphs can be constructed for multiple parameter
values and combined together to form the node integrated
risk graph using the risk graph additivity property [38], [39].
The aforementioned risk graph can also be extended to a
directed risk graph, where the removal of components in a
specific order in strong node combinations are considered. The
study in [40] constructs the directed node risk graphs and the
directed node integrated risk graph with the same concept as
its undirected counterpart in the studies in [38] and [39].
Another similar concept to risk graph is the double contin-
gency graph introduced in [41]. While m contingency com-
binations of attack scenarios for the power grid was studied
in the risk graphs, many methods focus on N-2 contingency
analysis as the power grid is considered to be N-1 protected
[90]. In the double contingency graph, the vertices of the graph
are the transmission lines, and the links between vertices show
pairs of transmission lines whose simultaneous failure as initial
triggers can affect the reliability of the system by, for instance,
violating the thermal constraint rules in the power grid. Similar
to the risk graph, double contingency graph only considers
combinations of initial triggers and lacks information about
the components, which will be affected due to the outage
of the initial triggers. Therefore, the work in [41] uses a
combination of the double contingency graph with influence
graph for reliability analysis of the power grid.
3) Correlation-Based Interaction Graph: The work in [42]
presents a graph of interactions for power grids based on
the correlation among the failures of the components. In the
correlation-based interaction graph in [42], vertices represent
the transmission lines, and the edges represent the pairwise
correlation between line failures in the cascade dataset. The
correlation dependence between failures are captured in the
correlation matrix, whose ijth elements are positive Pear-
son correlation coefficient between the failure statuses of
components i and j in the cascade dataset. The resulting
correlation matrix is symmetric and can be interpreted as an
undirected and weighted interaction graph, where the nodes
are the failed lines, the edges are the interactions between
the lines, and the weights are the correlation values among
the components. Similarly, the studies in [29] and [30] also
construct correlation-based interactions graphs from simulated
cascade dataset consisting of sequences of transmission line
failures.
4) Comparison of Data-Driven Methods for Constructing
Interaction Graphs: In the past decade, cascading failures
have been actively modeled and analyzed using data-driven
interaction graphs. These graphs can be considered as abstract
models of power grids for studying cascading failures; as
the physical details of the system such as generation, load
consumption, line power flows, capacity constraints, etc., are
not explicitly considered; instead, they are implicitly captured
through the cascade data. This section provides a brief com-
parison among the data-driven interaction graphs and discusses
their key properties and limitations (summarized in Table II).
One key difference among the data-driven methods for
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Category Key Properties Limitations
Outage
Sequence:
Consecutive
Failures
• Simple derivation of interactions based on
consecutive order of failures, resulting in directed graphs.
• Weights of interactions are assigned using various
methods, e.g., statistical analysis or physical/electrical
properties of the system.
• Only considers direct one-to-one
consecutive interactions in cascades.
• Does not consider interactions
between groups of components.
Outage
Sequence:
Generation-
based
Failures
• Interactions are considered between groups of
components (based on the concept of generations) and are
used to define one-to-one interaction links between
components of consecutive generations.
• Considers order of failures/interactions, resulting
in directed graphs.
• Interactions between groups of
components of two consecutive generations
characterized using various methods
(may overestimate/underestimate
the interactions).
Outage
Sequence:
Influence-
based
• Generation-based interactions are considered to
define one-to-one interaction links between components
based on the influence framework.
• Considers order of failures/interactions, resulting
in directed graphs.
• Considers propagation rate of line outages as
well as their probability of causing further outages
through influence framework.
• Influence-based framework provides mathematical
tractability for certain analysis of the dynamics of failures.
• Interaction links among all pairs of
components of two consecutive generations
may overestimate the interactions.
Outage
Sequence:
Multiple and
Simultaneous
Failures
• Characterizes simultaneous interactions between
groups of components instead of only one-to-one
interactions between pairs of individual components.
• Considers order of failures/interactions, resulting
in directed graphs.
• Considers group interactions, eliminating the
challenge of overestimation or underestimation of
pair-wise interactions between individual components.
• The number of nodes in the resulted
graphs (to capture possible states of group
interactions) will be large.
Risk-graph
• Characterizes the interactions based on targeted
failures of the components, resulting in directed graphs.
• Requires small dataset for small number of
targeted failures.
• Interactions between groups of
components are not considered.
• Reduced performance when
number of targeted failures increase.
Correlation-based • Uses simple statistical correlation measure toconstruct the graph.
• Does not consider the order of
failures in interactions.
• Does not consider group interactions.
• Resulted graphs are usually dense.
constructing interaction graphs is the type of data that they
need to build the graph. For instance, influence-based methods
can be applied to both simulation data as well as historical
data. However, for the consecutive failure-based methods, such
as fault-chains, as well as risk graphs, the sequence of failures
needs to be generated by targeted failure of components to
create a comprehensive list of failures to build the interaction
graph. Moreover, as the combinations of the initial targeted
failures increase, the computational complexity of generating
the list of failures and building the risk graphs also increases.
Another difference among the data-driven methods is their
ability in considering group interactions; e.g., the consecutive
failures-based methods can only consider one-to-one interac-
tions based on direct consecutive orders of failures. However,
generation-based and influence-based methods can consider
the influence of a group of components on another group of
components (using the concept of generations) and use it to
define one-to-one interactions among pairs of components.
Multiple and simultaneous failures interaction methods not
only consider the influence of a group of components on an-
other group but also allow for interaction links among groups
of components instead of individual pairs of components. The
data-driven methods for constructing interaction graphs result
in directed graphs except for the correlation-based method.
The correlation-based method cannot capture the order and
direction of interactions due to symmetric properties of the
correlation measure. Another challenge with the correlation-
based method is that the method generally results in dense
graphs, with many links showing small correlations among
the components, which may need to be thresholded or applied
9with other techniques to be able to focus on more significant
correlations. In general, one of the key limitations of the
data-driven methods is the heavy dependency of the derived
graphs and inferred interactions on the dataset and the applied
method, which may lead to overestimation/underestimation of
the interactions. As shown in [29], [30], interaction graphs
derived from different outage data are different and can lead
to different conclusions; e.g., the operating setting of the
power grid (such as its loading level) will affect the cascade
process and the cascade dataset [91] and, consequently, lead to
different interaction graphs. Using a single interaction graph to
model power grids and capture all possible operating setting
conditions that can affect the system is still a challenge to
address. There is also a need to test the interaction graphs to
historical cascade data [64]. Historical data shows the heavy-
tailed distribution of blackout sizes and can be used to bench-
mark the data-driven interaction graphs [64]. Similarly, cross
validating the various techniques with each other may also
provide insights into the most useful techniques in extracting
interactions from cascade data.
B. Electric Distance-Based Interaction Graphs
While there is abundant literature focused on data-driven
interaction graphs, various methods have been proposed for
modeling interactions among the components using the dy-
namics of power flow as well as the physical/electrical prop-
erties of the system and components. In this review, such meth-
ods are called electric distance-based methods.
In a power grid, electricity does not flow through the
shortest path between two nodes i and j. Instead, it can
flow through parallel paths between nodes i and j based on
the physical properties of the system and its components as
well as the physics of electricity (i.e., Ohm’s law). Thus,
the electrical interactions between the components may extend
beyond the physical topology and the direct connections in
the power grid. The concept of electric distance was first
introduced by Lagonotte et al. [78] in 1989 as a measure of
coupling between buses in the power system and was based
on sensitivities in the power system due to changes in voltage
magnitudes. There are various methods in the literature for
characterizing the electrical distances between components.
These methods can use distribution factors in power grids
including power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) [92],
which indicates the change in real power on transmission lines
due to changes in real power injection at different nodes of
the system, and line outage distribution factor (LODF) [93],
which measures the changes in the power flow of transmission
lines due to the outage of another line. Next, the electric
distance-based methods for constructing interaction graphs are
discussed in two categories: outage condition-based and non-
outage condition-based as shown in Table III.
1) Outage Condition-Based Interaction Graph: This class
of methods for characterizing electric distance-based interac-
tion graphs are focused on interactions among the components
of the power grid during outage conditions. For instance, in the
study presented in [44], interactions among the components
as well as their weights are derived using the changes in the
power flows in transmission lines during outage conditions.
Thus, the outage induced interaction graph Gi consists of the
set of vertices Vi that represent the transmission lines and the
set of edges Ei that represent the impact of outage of one line
on another. This impact is characterized using LODF [93],
where LODF for line ei,j ∈ Ei is calculated based on the
ratio of the impact of outage of line i on line j based on the
reactance of all possible spanning tree paths between the lines,
over the impact of outage of line i on line j using the reactance
of all alternative spanning tree paths where the power can flow
(i.e., excluding the spanning tree path of line i) [43].
However, during cascading failures, the impact of a failed
line on the remaining lines is not limited to changes in power
flows. In a power grid, if two or more lines share a bus, outage
of one line may expose the remaining lines (connected through
the same bus) to incorrect tripping due to malfunctioning of
the protection relays. The exposed lines are prone to failure
and an increase in power flow in the exposed lines exacerbates
their tripping probability causing further outages. Such failures
are known as hidden failures. In the studies in [45]–[47],
vertices Vi represent transmission lines as well as a hidden
failure state, and edges Ei represent inter-line interactions as
well as interactions between lines and the hidden failure state.
Thus, the interaction graph Gi will have n + 1 nodes where
n is the number of transmission lines, and the extra one node
represents the hidden failure state. The hidden failure node
has bidirectional links from itself to every other node in the
power grid. However, the hidden failure node does not have
any influence on itself. The inter-line interaction ei,j ∈ Ei
shows the increase of power flow in line j due to outage of
line i. The interaction from the hidden failure node to a line
i reflects the likelihood of failure of line i due to the failure
of other nodes when the power flow in line i exceeds a flow
limit margin. Interaction from line i to the hidden failure node
reflects the average tripping probability of all the other lines
due to the outage of line i. This interaction can be regarded
as the aggregated influence that the outage of line i has on the
tripping probability of all the other remaining lines.
2) Non-Outage Condition-Based Interaction Graphs: This
class of methods for constructing the electric distance-based
interaction graphs is focused on interactions among the com-
ponents of the power grid during normal operating conditions.
For instance, measures to capture the characteristics of the
power flow paths between components, such as impedance of
the transmission lines, can be used to form electric distance-
based interaction graphs. Moreover, power system sensitivities
based on PTDF and the ones showing changes in voltage
magnitudes and voltage phase angles, derived from Jacobian
matrices during normal conditions, can also be used to form
electric distance-based interaction graphs. In this paper, non-
outage condition-based interaction graphs are broadly cate-
gorized into two categories: impedance-based and Jacobian.
Next, both categories are discussed in detail.
a) Impedance-Based Interaction Graph: Impedance-
based electric distance interaction graphs Gi consist of vertices
Vi that represent buses and edges Ei that represent elec-
trical interactions between pairs of buses weighted by their
corresponding impedance-based electrical distances. Inverse
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TABLE III: Classification of existing studies using the electric distance-based taxonomy.
Category Subcategory Further Subcategory Works
Electric Distance-based
Interaction Graphs
Outage Condition-based [43], [44], [45], [46], [47]
Non-outage Condition-based Impedance-based
[24], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53],
[54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59]
Jacobian [52], [60], [61], [62], [63]
admittance matrix, more commonly known as the impedance
matrix Z, is one of the simplest forms of representing electrical
interactions between pairs of buses in the system and is found
by inverting the system admittance matrix Y, i.e., Z = Y−1.
Matrix Z shows the relationship between the nodal bus voltage
vector and the nodal current injection vector. However, unlike
matrix Y, which is sparse, impedance matrix Z is non-sparse
as it represents the changes in nodal voltage throughout the
system due to a single nodal current injection between a pair of
nodes in the system. Therefore, edges in the impedance-based
interaction graph are the connections between the elements in
the Z matrix with weights between buses i and j correspond-
ing to their absolute value of the impedance, i.e., |Zij | [48]–
[52]. Smaller magnitudes of impedance represent shorter elec-
tric distance between buses. Note that the individual elements
Zij in matrix Z are complex valued. The studies in [53]–
[55] also adopt the concept of representing electrical distances
between buses using the Thevenin equivalent impedance be-
tween buses but apply the condition that power only flows
from generator buses to load buses such that impedance values
between generator buses and load buses suggest edges in the
interaction graph. Similarly, in the study in [56], in addition
to the impedance between pairs of generator and load buses in
the system, the power flows through the lines along the path
between the pairs of buses is considered. Therefore, electrical
connections between generator and load buses i and j along
path k, are weighted by the impedance between buses i and
j as well as the PTDF of the lines along the path k of power
flows between the buses. In the studies in [53]–[56], matrix Z
has dimension ZG × ZL, where ZG and ZL are the number
of generator and load buses, respectively. Thus, matrix Z may
be asymmetric, depending on the number of generators and
load as well as the entry of the elements suggesting that the
interaction graph is directed.
Note that studies in [48]–[56] are not focused on cascading
failures, but their concept of formulating impedance-based
electrical distances can be extended for studying cascade
processes. For example, in the study in [24], transmission
lines are considered as the nodes of the interaction graph,
and thus, impedance-based electric distances between pairs of
transmission lines are assigned as weights of the interaction
links. To find the electric distance between transmission lines
i and j, where line i connects bus is to id and line j connects
bus js to jd, the minimum of the four possible Thevenin
equivalent impedances between the pairs of buses, i.e., Zisjs ,
Zisjd , Zidjs , and Zidjd is taken. This interaction graph is also
the third layer of the multi-layered interaction graph discussed
in Section III-A1b used for modeling cascading failures.
Cascading failures can also be studied by representing
interactions between pairs of nodes by effective resistances
between the nodes. Effective resistance, Rij , between nodes
i and j, also known as Klein resistance distance [94], is the
equivalent resistance of all parallel paths between the nodes.
It was initially introduced in the study in [94] as a measure of
distance in graph theory, and in the context of power systems,
it shows the potential difference between nodes i and j due
to unit current injection at node i and withdrawal at node
j. While impedance-based electrical distances between nodes
account for non-linear approximations of power flow, effective
resistances only consider linear approximations of power flows
in the grid. For cascading failure analysis, as the impedance of
a transmission line in a high voltage transmission network is
dominated by the imaginary part of impedance, i.e., reactance,
the effective resistance between nodes can be formulated
in terms of their reactance. Thus, in the studies in [57]–
[59], effective resistance between nodes i and j is found as
Rij = Qii − 2Qij +Qjj where, Qij is the row i and column
j element of Q+, which is the Penrose pseudo-inverse of the
Laplacian matrix Q. Matrix Q is defined as the difference
between the weighted diagonal degree matrix and the weighted
adjacency matrix derived from the physical topology and
shows the relationship between the buses and transmission
lines in the grid. In the studies in [57]–[59], the weights of
the edges in the physical topology required for finding the
weighted diagonal degree matrix and adjacency matrix are
the susceptance (i.e., the imaginary part of impedance) values
between the nodes. Note that matrix Q constructed using
susceptance values is equivalent to matrix Y. Thus, edges Ei in
the effective resistance interaction graph reflect the electrical
connections between the buses with weights between nodes i
and j being the corresponding Rij values.
b) Jacobian Interaction Graph: Electric distance-based
interaction graphs can also be constructed using the sensitivity
matrix of the power grid during normal operating conditions.
In such interaction graph Gi, vertices Vi represent the buses,
and the edges Ei represent the electrical interactions in terms
of sensitivities between the buses. These sensitivities can be
found using the Jacobian matrix, which is obtained during
Newton–Raphson-based load flow computation. Jacobian sen-
sitivity matrix J shows the effect of complex power injection
at a bus on the voltage magnitude and voltage phase angles
of other buses. It consists of four sub-matrices: matrix JPθ,
which shows the relationship between nodal active power
injections and voltage phase angle changes; matrix JPV,
which shows the relationship between nodal active power
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injections and voltage magnitude changes; matrix JQθ, which
shows the relationship between nodal reactive power injections
and voltage phase angle changes; and matrix JQV, which
shows the relationship between nodal reactive power injections
and voltage magnitude changes. The inverse of any of these
Jacobian sub-matrices, denoted as J−1, can be used to find the
sensitivity matrix by using the Klein resistance distance [94],
whose individual element is calculated as xii+xjj−xij−xji,
where xij represents the element in row i and column j
of the inverted Jacobian sub-matrix J−1 in consideration.
In the study in [52], all of the four Jacobian sub-matrices
are applied to Klein resistance distance to form sensitivity
matrices for the purpose of visualizing power grids, which in
turn can be used to form interaction graphs whose edges Ei
represent the electrical interactions between the components
of the sensitivity matrices weighted by their corresponding
elements.
However, the literature has revealed that most studies are
focused on two of the four Jacobian sub-matrices, i.e., matrix
JPθ and matrix JQV. The remaining sub-matrices JQθ and
matrix JPV are not used in the literature due to un-intuitive
interpretations. The seminal work of electrical distances by
Lagonotte et al. in [78] focuses on using the Jacobian sub-
matrix (JQV), also known as the voltage sensitivity matrix
∂V/∂Q, to find the electric distance between buses. Similarly,
the study in [60] also uses the voltage sensitivity matrix. In
both studies, the matrix of maximum attenuations is found,
which consists of columns of voltage sensitivity matrix divided
by the diagonal values. Finally, electrical interactions ei,j ∈ Ei
between buses i and j weighted by their electric distance is
derived as the logarithm of the individual elements of the
attenuation matrix. The study in [61] also uses the voltage
sensitivity matrix to find electric distance between buses, but
instead of finding matrix of attenuations, the study applies
the sensitivity matrix to Klein resistance distance formulation.
Note that studies in [60], [61] analyze risk of cascading
failures by studying the voltage collapse phenomenon, which
is a sequential process during which large parts of the power
grid may suffer due to low voltages [95]. Similarly, the
studies in [62] and [63] apply the Jacobian sub-matrix JPθ
or the sensitivity matrix ∂P/∂θ to Klein resistance distance
and find electrical distances between buses. However, the
studies [62], [63] are not focused on cascading failure analysis
but are included in this review as their electric distance-
based interaction graphs can have potential implications for
analyzing cascading failures.
3) Key Properties and Limitations of Electric Distance-
Based Interaction Graphs: In this section, key properties and
limitations of the electric distance-based interaction graphs are
briefly discussed. However, various methods are not directly
compared as different methods have different applications as
well as concepts in their models.
Electric distance-based methods consider the fundamental
characteristics of a power grid and the power flow while defin-
ing interactions among components. These graphs differ from
data-driven interaction graphs as they directly use the inherent
electrical properties of power grids based on Kirchoff’s and
Ohm’s laws. They are also not specific to cascading failure
studies and can be used for a variety of applications such
as contingency analysis [49], reliability studies for defining
zones for load deliverability analysis [51], response to targeted
attacks [55], and so on. Specifically, grid attributes such as ad-
mittance/impedance matrices, Jacobian matrices, and PTDF’s
reflect the operational features of power grids and can be used
for the mentioned applications. Since these graphs do not
rely on extensive simulation data, computational complexity
of finding such graphs is relatively small.
For cascading failure analysis, LODF-based interaction
graphs [43], [44] as well as interaction graphs showing the
impact of hidden failures [45]–[47] on lines during cascades
have been used. These methods usually work well for cascade
scenarios involving a small number of contingencies and
smaller sized system. However, constructing such interaction
graphs for cascade studies involving a large number of con-
tingencies is computationally expensive. To this end, effective
resistance-based interaction graphs can be used for cascade
studies, as they can be easily produced by finding the effective
resistance [57]–[59] between components without extensive
power flow simulations. In addition to the above mentioned
applications, electric distance-based interaction graphs can
also be used for visualizing distinct electrical structure of
power grids in two dimensions [52].
IV. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS USING INTERACTION
GRAPHS OF POWER GRIDS
Interaction graphs constructed in Section III can be used
for various analysis; specifically related to the reliability of
the power grid, including analyzing the role of components
and finding critical ones that contribute heavily in a cascade
process, predicting distribution of cascades sizes, and studying
patterns and structures that reveal connections and properties
of the components in the power grid that extend beyond
physical topology-based graphs. Thus, reliability studies per-
formed using these interaction graphs are divided into various
categories as discussed below.
A. Critical Component Analysis
The studies that identify and analyze the role of critical
components in power grid’s reliability are classified into three
broad categories that include (1) using pre-existing as well
as novel measures to find critical buses/transmission lines, (2)
evaluating attack strategies that cause significant damage in
the power grid, and (3) employing mitigation measures such
as upgrading transmission lines or adding new components to
protect the identified critical components.
1) Critical Component Identification: This class of reliabil-
ity analyses focus on finding critical buses/transmission lines
by analyzing structural properties of interaction graphs using
standard centrality measures such as degree, betweenness, etc.
(for a review of standard centrality measures, refer to [85]) or
by defining novel interaction graph based metrics.
a) Critical Component Identification Using Standard
Centrality Measures: In the studies presented in [14]–[16],
[18]–[20], fault chain-based interaction graphs are found to
be scale free graphs, indicating that most nodes possess low
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degrees but a limited number of nodes possess high in and
out degrees. Thus, in the fault chain-based interaction graphs,
vertices with higher degrees are assumed to be the critical
components of the system. Similar conclusions are obtained by
authors in the studies in [50], [54], where the impedance-based
interaction graph is observed to be scale-free and consisting
of a limited number of nodes with high degrees, which are
considered as the critical components of the system. These
are examples of works that consider the degree centrality
measure to identify critical components of the system. Other
centrality measures such as betweenness, eigenvector, and
PageRank have also been considered on interaction graph-
based representations of power grids including [45], [47], [61]
to find critical components of the system.
b) Critical Component Identification Using New Central-
ity Measures: In addition to the studies that rely on stan-
dard centrality measures; some works develop new centrality
measures in the context of power grids and the developed
interaction graphs to analyze criticality of the components.
For instance, in the generation-based interaction graphs [21]–
[24], [26], out-strength measure, which is the sum of the
weights of the interaction links originating from a node, is
used to find critical transmission lines. Such lines are the
ones whose failure at any stage of the cascade including
the initial stage or the propagation stage induces failure in
a significant number of other transmission lines. Outages
in the initial stages are caused by external factors such as
bad weather conditions, improper vegetation management, and
exogenous events, whereas outages in the propagation stage
is due to power flow re-distributions, hidden failures, and
other interactions between components as discussed in Section
II-A. Influence-based [27], [28] and multiple and simultaneous
failure [31] interaction graphs are also used to find critical
transmission lines, but they explicitly focus on lines whose
failure during the propagation stage of cascading failures
causes large cascades. Particularly, the studies in [27], [28]
use a cascade probability vector derived using the influence-
based interaction graph to quantify the probability of failure
of lines during the propagation stage of cascades and define
critical lines as the ones whose corresponding entries in the
probability vector have higher values. Similarly, the study in
[31] finds the probability distribution of states of the multiple
and simultaneous failure-based interaction graph and defines
critical lines as the ones that belong to states with higher
probability of occurrence. Influence-based and correlation-
based interaction graphs constructed in the studies in [29],
[30] are also used to find the critical transmission lines during
cascade processes by using a community-centrality measure.
As the name suggests, the measure quantifies the criticality
of transmission lines based on their community membership,
where critical lines are the ones that belong to multiple
communities or act as bridges between communities. Note
that communities are defined as groups of vertices with strong
connections among themselves and few connections outside
(for definition of communities and a review of community
detection methods on graphs, refer to [96]).
Identification of critical lines is not limited to data-driven
interaction graphs. Multiple studies use electric distance-based
interaction graphs for such analysis as well. Effective resis-
tance between components in the effective resistance-based
interaction graph can be summed for all node pairs in the
graph to find the effective graph resistance metric of the
power grid. Effective graph resistance metric was initially
defined in the study in [94] as Kirchhoff index and used in
the study in [97] as a robustness metric. Lower values of
this metric suggest that the power grid is robust to cascading
failures. Effective graph resistance can also be found using the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix of the
grid [98]. In the study in [57], critical transmission lines are
found by measuring the changes in effective graph resistance
before and after the removal of the line. In a similar manner,
impedance-based interaction graphs constructed in the study
in [56] and [53] are also used to find critical transmission lines
by measuring the changes in net-ability metric before and after
the removal of a line. Net-ability reflects the performance of
a network by quantifying the ability of a generator to transfer
power to a load within the power flow limits.
2) Studying the Effect of Line Upgrades and Line Addi-
tions on Reliability of Power Grids: While identification of
critical components in the power grid is necessary, assessing
the impact of modifications and protection of such critical
components in the overall power grid is the next step in the
study. In the studies presented in [27] and [28], an influence
interaction graph-based metric is used to quantify the impact of
upgrading the critical lines (for example, by improving vegeta-
tion management around the lines or by improving protection
systems) on cascade propagation. The work in [31] uses the
multiple and simultaneous failure-based interaction graph to
do a similar study. In both interaction graphs, the authors
conclude that upgrading lines that take part in the propagation
of failures during cascades reduces the risk of large cascades
compared to the upgrade of lines that initiate cascades. While
the studies in [27], [28] investigate the performance of the
power grid networks after line upgrades, the studies in [58]
and [59] use effective graph resistance metric to study the
impact of adding transmission lines in optimal locations of the
power grid. However, in [59] the authors warn that placing an
additional line between a pair of nodes does not necessarily
imply increased robustness of the grid. In fact, grid robustness
may decrease after adding additional lines (due to Braess’s
paradox [99]), if the additions are done haphazardly.
3) Analyzing Response to Attack/Failure Scenarios: In ad-
dition to identifying critical components and characterizing the
impact of their modifications in the reliability of power grids,
the study of the response of power grids to attacks and failures
is also necessary. Such studies can be used to find critical
components and attack strategies that threaten the reliability
of the overall power grid. In the studies in [38]–[40], node
integrated risk graphs are used to find groups of transmission
lines whose removal from the graph causes the largest drop in
net-ability of the power grid, as discussed in Section III-A2.
These groups can be found in real-time independent of system
parameters. The study in [59] also analyzes the robustness
of power grids to deliberate attacks using the effective graph
resistance metric, as discussed in Section IV-A1b.
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B. Prediction of Cascade Sizes
Forecasting cascade sizes is another challenge in the relia-
bility analysis of power grids. In the study in [42], a correlation
graph-based statistical model, known as the co-susceptibility
model, is used to predict cascade size distributions in trans-
mission network of power grids using individual failure prob-
abilities of transmission lines as well as failure correlations
between transmission lines found from the correlation matrix.
The study exploits the idea that groups of components that
have higher correlations are likely to fail together and uses
the correlation matrix to find such co-susceptible groups,
which is an approximate estimate of the cascade size given
an initial trigger failure. A similar idea is used in the studies
in [29], [30], where components within the same community
are assumed to be likely to fail together, and the size of
communities gives an approximation of cascade sizes. The
study in [31] also characterizes size of cascades by using the
states of the Markov chain to find the probability distribution
of the number of generations in a cascade.
C. Studying Patterns and Structures in Interactions
Structures and patterns in networks are important in de-
scribing the spread of various processes such as infectious
diseases, behaviors, rumors, etc. [100]–[102]. For instance,
in the studies in [29], [30], [43], [44], structures present in
the interaction graphs of power grids are used to study the
impact of cascading failures in the transmission network
and utilize the graph structure to mitigate large cascades.
The graph structure considered in the studies in [29], [30]
are communities whereas the graph structure considered in
the studies in [43], [44] are tree partitions.
In the study in [43], tree structures present in the outage
condition-based interaction graph showed that transmission
line failures could not propagate across common areas of
tree partitions. Further, the extended work of [43] in [44]
found the critical components of the tree partitions, known
as bridges. The failure of bridge lines plays a crucial role in
the propagation of cascading failures. However, failure of non-
bridge components does not propagate failures and the impact
is more likely to be contained inside smaller regions/cells.
This important property of bridge lines is used in mitigation
of cascading failures by switching off transmission lines that
cause negligible network congestion as well as improve the
robustness of the system. Similarly, in the studies in [29],
[30], influence-based and correlation-based interaction graphs
were used to limit propagation of cascading failures inside
community structures. Particularly, the authors used the idea
that failures can be trapped within communities by protecting
the bridge/overlap nodes, which connect multiple communities
together.
Purposes of analyzing structures present in the interaction
graphs are not limited to mitigation of cascading failures. For
instance, in the study in [49], network structures were used for
contingency analysis. The impedance-based interaction graph
in [49] was pruned by removing edges above an operator
defined threshold. Then, the common structure between the
pruned impedance-based interaction graph and the topological
graph of the power grid was analyzed and verified to be the
contingencies that violate transmission line limits and cause
overloads. Similarly, the study in [51] identified zonal pat-
terns in the impedance-based interaction graph for reliability
assessment of zones for load deliverability analysis.
V. SUMMARY
Analyzing interactions among the components of power
grids during cascading failures can reveal important informa-
tion about the failure propagation process in these systems and
the role of the components in the process. It was discussed
that the physical topology of the power grids have limitations
in modeling cascading failure process in power grids. As
such, new methods are emerging to capture non-local influ-
ences/interactions among the components of the power grid.
In this survey, various techniques for constructing the graph
of interactions (beyond the physical topology of the power
grid) were reviewed. A novel taxonomy was presented for
classifying the existing research studies into various categories
and subcategories based on the type of data and techniques
used in inferring the interactions and creating the graph model
of the system. Finally, a brief overview of various reliability
analysis studies based on the interaction graphs was presented.
Specifically, the presented taxonomy introduced two main
categories for the methods of constructing interaction graphs:
data-driven and electric distance-based approaches. The key
properties and limitations of various techniques in each cate-
gory as well as an overview of the methods in each category
have been discussed. While for data-driven methods, avail-
ability of cascade data is a necessity, the electric distance-
based methods rely on accurate physical models of the system
(which are not required for data-driven methods). Therefore,
depending on the availability of the data or the physical model
of the system, one can choose between these categories of
methods. Moreover, as the existing methods use various infor-
mation for inferring and modeling interactions, they can shed
light on various aspects of the cascade process and reliability
and vulnerability of the components. As such, depending on
the analysis of interest, different techniques can be selected.
Studies in both areas of data-driven and electric distance-based
approaches are ongoing, and it can be expected that these
methods will greatly contribute in providing new understand-
ings about the cascade process in power grids. Furthermore,
in the area of cascading failure reliability analysis based on
interaction graphs, recent literature is more inclined towards
identifying structures and patterns in the interaction graphs
to study the vulnerabilities in power grids. However, other
analyses, such as predicting the path and size of the cascades,
can also utilize the interaction graphs of the system.
Next, future directions of research related to the interaction
graphs for cascading failure analysis are briefly reviewed.
One of the key areas of research in this domain would be
to relax the dependence of the constructed interaction graph
on the applied method, data, and operating characteristics of
the system. As discussed in this survey, the method used
for inferring the interactions; the available data; and the
operating setting of the system, such as the loading level of its
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components, all affect the interaction graphs. It is important to
be able to derive unified graphs of interactions that implicitly
capture the effect of such factors in the model. Moreover, the
computational complexity of constructing interaction graphs
(which increases with the size and scale of power grids) has
limited their application to off-line analysis of reliability. This
limitation suggests the need for further research in developing
more effective data-driven and electric distance-based methods
for developing real-time analysis based on interaction graphs
for time sensitive analysis during cascading failures.
In addition, most of the existing studies using the interaction
graphs are observed to be focused on the identification of the
critical components of the power grid. Such analyses can be
a step towards developing mitigation strategies that can be
applied to create more reliable power grids. As such, it is
important that practical and economically feasible mitigation
strategies be studied and developed, based on the insights
provided by the interaction graphs.
Finally, in order to create resilient and reliable power grids,
it is important to understand the role of interactions among
the components of the system in reliability challenges, such
as cascading failures, as discussed in this paper. However, in
addition to the reliability analysis of the physical components
of the system, it is also important to consider soft factors, such
as human factors and their influences on the system as well as
operating policies in reliability analysis and planning. Such in-
teraction analyses will be an essential research direction for
future studies of cascading failures and one example of such
study is presented in the work in [103].
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